Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 6 | Number 4 Article 2
2-10-1995
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1995) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 6 : No. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol6/iss4/2
26                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
make it clear that the commodity should not be sold back to
the employer.
• Any security interest against the commodity as collateral
should be released as to the quantity of the commodity used
for in-kind wage payment.
Consequences
If the arrangement is successful, the employee reports
the fair market value of the commodity as wage income for
income tax purposes and any gain or loss on subsequent
sale should be reported on Schedule D (unless the employee
is otherwise involved in the trade or business of producing
the commodity).  Apparently, the expenses associated with
the commodity in an employee's hands are subject to the
two-percent floor for employee business expenses.13  Direct
costs of disposing of the commodity such as transportation
to market should be reported as a reduction in the sales
price of the commodity.
Conclusion
The key question now is whether and the extent to
which the guidelines will influence the national office of
IRS in issuing regulations.  Presumably, the rulings issued
in the future will reflect the guidelines.
Another major issue is how IRS will handle matters
already in audit or that arise before taxpayers have had an
opportunity to comply with the guidelines.  The guidelines
themselves do not address that question.  It is believed that
IRS agents will follow the guidelines but it is not clear
whether there will be a transitional period of less
demanding requirements.
FOOTNOTES
1 N. Harl, "New Rules Coming on Payment of Wages In-
Kind, 5 Agric. L. Dig. 81 (1994).  See also N. Harl,
"Paying Wages in Kind," 3 Agric. L. Dig. 81 (1992); N.
Harl, "Paying Wages in Kind:  Proposed Repeal of the
Provision," 3 Agric. L. Dig. 121 (1992).  See generally 4
Harl, Agricultural Law § 36.02[3] (1994); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 4.06 [2][a](1994).
2
"Payment in Kind Guidelines," Sept. 8, 1994.
3
"Noncash Remuneration for Agricultural Labor."
4 I.R.C. § 3121(a)(8).
5 I.R.C. § 3306(b)(11).
6 See I.R.C. §§ 3401(a)(2), 3121(a), 3121(a)(8).
7 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.429(c)(3), 404.1055.
8 Ltr. Rul. 8252018, Sept. 17, 1982 (wages paid as
percentage of milk, calves and grain); Ltr. Rul. 8738005,
June 5, 1987 (employer-provided livestock production
care).
9 See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 9428003, April 5, 1994 (payment of
grain to husband and wife as employees of farm
corporation disapproved even though grain removed to
employees' own storage and held from 5 to 60 days
before sale by employees).
10 See n. 2 supra.
11 Id.
12 Rev. Rul. 79-207, 1979-2 C.B. 351.
13 I.R.C. § 67.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
WILD ANIMALS. The plaintiff was engaged in the
business of breeding and selling wild and exotic animals.
The plaintiff had obtained a license under the federal
Animal Welfare Act and the Indiana Department of Natural
Resources. The plaintiff’s business was within the city
limits of the defendant and the defendant passed an
ordinance prohibiting the keeping of wild animals within the
city limits. The plaintiff filed a suit challenging the
ordinance as preempted by the federal and state statutes, as a
violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S Constitution,
and as a taking of the plaintiff’s interest in the state and
federal licenses without compensation. The court held that
the federal and state statutes did not preempt the ordinance
because neither statute attempted to fully regulate the
business of wild animals. The court also held that the
ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the defendant’s
police power to protect its citizens from potentially
dangerous animals. Finally, the court held that in order to
recover for a governmental taking of property, the plaintiff
should bring a state court suit for invalidation or inverse
condemnation.  DeHart v. Town of Austin, IN, 39 F.3d
718 (7th Cir. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtors were in the business of
buying and selling hogs and had filed for Chapter 7. One of
the creditors had purchased or transported hogs owned by
the debtors and objected to the debtors’ discharge on the
basis that the debtors failed to keep adequate records of their
business. The creditor argued that the debtors’ records did
not comply with state and federal recordkeeping
requirements. The court held that failure to comply with
state and federal recordkeeping requirements was not per se
sufficient to deny discharge if the debtors otherwise
maintained sufficient records to determine the financial
status of the business. The debtors’ records consisted
primarily of monthly profit and loss statements and balance
sheets prepared by the debtors’ accountant. The court held
that these records were insufficient because the records did
not create a complete “paper trail” of all transactions of the
debtors’ business sufficient to determine that the financial
affairs of the business complied with all bankruptcy
requirements. In re Vandewoestyne, 174 B.R. 518 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1994).
The debtors were husband and wife and farmed a farm
owned by the wife’s aunt on a 50 percent profit share basis.
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The husband was given a general power of attorney by the
aunt in order for the husband to conduct some of the aunt’s
business and legal affairs. The husband borrowed money
from the aunt on several occasions without providing any
promissory note or collateral. The aunt did not question the
loans because she trusted the husband. The debtors
purchased another farm using some of the money borrowed
from the aunt and securing the purchase loan with
certificates of deposit owned by the aunt. The aunt was
informed about all of the loans and was independently
interviewed by the lending bank. The aunt did not ask the
debtors to repay any of the loans. The aunt finally refused
any additional loans when all of the aunt’s CDs were
pledged for existing loans and the aunt refused to mortgage
her farm. The debtors filed for bankruptcy and sold all of
their farm land and equipment and repaid the bank and a
portion of the money borrowed from the aunt. The aunt
sought to have the remaining claim declared
nondischargeable because of fraud or because of defalcation
by the husband while the husband held the general power of
attorney. The court held that the claim was dischargeable
because the debtors made no false or other representations
about the loans and because the aunt did not make any
inquiries about the purpose of the loans or make any attempt
at repayment until the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The
court also held that the general power of appointment did
not make the debtor husband a fiduciary as to the loans
because the power of attorney only created an agency
relationship and the husband did not act independently of
the aunt in obtaining the loans. In re Johnson, 174 B.R.
537 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors’ home was owned by a land
trust with the debtors as beneficiaries. The husband
transferred his interest in the trust to the wife and she
transferred her interest in the trust to a trust for their
children, retaining a life interest in the trust property.  A
state court ruled that the transfer of the interests to the
children was a fraudulent transfer and the Bankruptcy Court
held that the trust was estate property. The trustee then
objected to the debtors’ claim of a homestead exemption for
the property, arguing that the husband could not claim a
homestead exemption where the property was owned
entirely by the wife and that Section 522(g) prevented the
debtors from claiming the property as exempt. The court
held that because the debtors always retained at least a life
estate in the property and had continual possession of the
property as a residence, the debtors could claim a homestead
exemption in the property. In re Miller, 174 B.R. 279
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
MODIFICATION OF PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 12
plan provided for payment of secured and unsecured claims
over the life of the plan. The debtors made only one annual
payment on the plan and made no other plan payments. The
debtors did not file for a modification of the plan before
they defaulted on the scheduled plan payment. A secured
creditor filed for relief from the automatic stay, which was
granted, and the debtors sold the collateral farm at a private
sale for an amount less than the creditor’s secured claim.
The debtors had ceased farming just after the default date
and never made any more payments under the plan. Four
years later, the debtors sought a discharge. The court held
that the debtors were not entitled to a discharge because the
debtors had not completed all payments under the plan, the
debtors did not obtain a modification of the plan before a
default, no grounds were presented for a hardship discharge,
and the debtors did not demonstrate an unanticipated change
of circumstances warranting modification of the plan. The
case was ordered dismissed for material default of the plan.
In re Fennig, 174 B.R. 475 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for setoff
of a portion of a Federal Land Bank’s claim by transfer to
the bank of the bank’s stock held by the debtors. The plan
also provided for 10 percent interest on deferred plan
payments to the bank. The Bankruptcy Court held that under
the majority of cases on the issue, the debtor could use a
transfer of the stock to the bank to offset the claim, to the
extent of the par value of the stock. The court also held that
10 percent interest on deferred plan payments was sufficient
because it equaled the prime rate of interest plus a risk
factor. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, holding
that Section 1225(a)(5)(C) has precedence over the Farm
Credit Bank regulations and that the redemption of the stock
could be required by the plan. The case was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals but during the pendency of
the appeal, the debtor voluntarily dismissed the bankruptcy
case. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as mooted by
the dismissal of the case and vacated the two lower court
decisions to remove any precedental effect. In re
Davenport, 40 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1994), vac’g, 153 B.R.
551 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) and 158 B.R. 830 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF TAX PAYMENTS. The debtors
were principals in a ranch corporation which owed FICA
(trust fund) taxes and other (non-trust fund) taxes. The
corporation made several pre-petition payments to the IRS
but did not designate which taxes were to be paid with the
funds; therefore, the IRS applied most of the payments to
the non-trust fund tax liability. The court held that because
the payments were undesignated by the corporation, the IRS
was free to allocate the payments in any manner. Post-
petition the IRS sent to the corporation an erroneous refund
check. The debtors were instructed by the IRS to cash the
check and to issue a new check to repay the refund.
However, the IRS allocated the refund check only partially
to the trust fund liability, even though the erroneous refund
had been made entirely from trust fund taxes. The court held
that the IRS claim for trust fund taxes would not be reduced
by the wrongful allocation of some of the refund payment to
non-trust fund taxes but that the IRS would also not be
allowed to increase the trust fund tax liability claim by the
amount allocated to the non-trust fund tax liability. In re
Plummer, 174 B.R. 284 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
CLAIMS. The debtors filed their Chapter 7 case in
November 1988 as a no asset case. However, in December
1988, assets were recovered and all creditors were sent a
notice setting a claims bar date of March 1989. The IRS
failed to file a claim until August 1994, stating that it had
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closed the case in April 1990 as a no asset case and
destroyed the file two years later. However, the IRS could
not demonstrate that it had not received notice of the new
claims bar date. The IRS argued that its claim was allowable
because the debtors had listed a tax claim on their schedules.
The court held that in Chapter 7, allowable claims must be
timely filed. The court also held that the claim would not be
allowed because the claim was filed more than five years
after the bar date, no excuse was offered for the failure to
file and the IRS received notice of the bar date. In re
Burnham, Connolly, Osterle & Henry, 174 B.R. 472
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994).
DISCHARGE. Although the debtors had a combined
monthly income of over $6,000, the debtors had not filed
federal income tax returns for 1983 through 1993, including
the period of their bankruptcy case. The trustee objected to
the debtors’ discharge because the debtors had not filed
income tax returns so that the trustee could determine the
debtors’ financial condition and whether any tax refund was
due. The debtors offered several “tax protester” arguments,
including a belief that no law required the filing of returns
and that the IRS had the duty to file the returns if the debtors
did not. The court held that I.R.C. § 6012 clearly required
the filing of returns and that no authority existed requiring
the IRS to file substitute returns. The court held that the
refusal to file tax returns and other acts of noncooperation
with the trustee in obtaining complete and accurate financial
records was sufficient to deny the debtors’ discharge. In re
Hall, 174 B.R. 210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
debtor had defaulted on a loan from a farm credit bank and
the bank obtained a foreclosure judgment against the farm
land securing the loan. The land was sold at an auction to
the bank. The bank made an in-house appraisal of the
property and offered the debtor the chance to purchase the
property at the appraised amount. The debtor was unable to
obtain financing in time to exercise the debtor’s right of first
refusal and the bank placed the land for sale by sealed bids,
with the appraisal amount as the minimum bid.  When no
bids were received, the bank contacted interested buyers and
obtained a contract to buy from one buyer at a much
reduced price. The bank then offered the land to the debtor
at the reduced price and required the debtor to respond
within 30 days and to close the sale within 15 days after the
debtor agreed to purchase the land. The debtor agreed to
repurchase the land at the lower price but was unable or
unwilling to close the deal on time. The bank sought
permission from the Bankruptcy Court to complete the sale
to the other buyers and the debtor objected that the
requirements of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 were
not met by the bank. The debtor argued that the initial
offering price was not correctly determined because the
bank did not have an independent appraisal of the property.
The court held that the Act does not require or prohibit any
specific source of the appraisal and that the debtor always
had the chance to match any other offer received by the
bank so that the fair market value would be used no matter
how flawed the original appraisal was. The debtor also
objected that the 15 day closing requirement was too short.
The court held that the 15 day period was sufficient because
the debtor had agreed to the 15 day closing without
objection and because the debtor’s past actions in filing
several bankruptcies had delayed the bank’s recovery for
several years. In re Wagner, 174 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1994).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
issued interim regulations implementing the Catastrophic
Risk Protection Program. 60 Fed. Reg. 1996 (Jan. 6, 1995),
adding 7 C.F.R. §§ 400.650-400.658, Part 402.
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
additional sanctions, including fines and disqualification, for
willfully and intentionally providing false or inaccurate
information and for adoption of a material scheme or device
to obtain insurance benefits. 60 Fed. Reg. 3106 (Jan. 13,
1995).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . In 1988, the plaintiff grew
potatoes, a nonprogram crop. Because of a drought that
year, the plaintiff’s potatoes suffered from “hollow heart”
which made the crop unmarketable. The CCC determined
that the plaintiff was not eligible for disaster payments
under the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 because the
quantity of potatoes harvested was not less than the statutory
level, Section 204 of the Act. Another section of the Act,
Section 205, allowed payments for reduced quality of
program crops. The plaintiff argued that disaster payments
for nonprogram crops should also be allowed for loss of
quality. The court held that the CCC interpretation was
reasonable given the absence of any statutory language for
nonprogram crops and express statutory language for
program crops and because the 1989 Act added a provision
for quality losses for nonprogram crops, indicating that
Congress had left such a provision out of the 1988 Act.
Greenhorn Farms v. Espy, 39 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1994).
MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM §
3.04.* The defendants were vegetable growers who entered
into an arm’s-length agreement with a labor contractor to
supply harvesters to harvest green beans. The court
examined ten factors to determine whether the defendants
were liable under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act as a joint employer with the
contractor for violations of MSAWPA. The court found that
(1) the defendants exercised no control over the workers
except what bean fields would be picked and when the
picking would commence each day; (2) the defendants had
no control over how many or which workers would be
employed each day; (3) the defendants did not control the
wages but only negotiated a total per hamper price for the
beans picked; (4) the defendants did not have the power to
discipline workers or to fire workers; and (5) the defendants
did not have control over payroll preparation or payment of
wages. The court held that these findings did not support
joint employment; therefore the defendants were not liable
for the MSAWPA violations by the labor contractor. The
court held that the defendants’ ownership of the equipment,
the labor contractor’s almost exclusive business with the
defendants and the low degree of skill required for the work
were not relevant to the issue of joint employment because
the workers were clearly employees and not independent
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contractors. The only factor found to support a joint
employment was the defendants’ ownership of the land and
the close relationship between the work performed by the
workers and the business of the defendants. Antenor v. D &
S Farms, 866 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
MILK MARKETING ORDERS. The plaintiffs were
milk handlers and milk producers in several zones of a Milk
Marketing Order. In 1989, at the urging of the Producers
Equalization Committee, the USDA Secretary revised the
location adjustments on the minimum price for milk
produced in the plaintiffs’ zones. No challenge was made to
the procedural methods for issuing the regulations but the
plaintiffs charged that the Secretary failed to consider the
supply and demand factors of 7 U.S.C. § 608c(18) in
revising the location adjustments because the location
adjustments were a part of the minimum price. The
Secretary argued that Section 608(c)(18) applied only for
determinations setting the basic minimum price for milk and
that location adjustments need only meet the requirements
of Section 608c(5). The court held that the statute was
ambiguous in that it was not clear whether the term
“minimum price” in Section 608c(18) included location
adjustments; therefore, the court held that the Secretary’s
interpretation deserved preference. Lansing Dairy, Inc. v.
Espy, 39 F.3d 1339 (6th Cir. 1994).
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION. The U.S.
Supreme court has reversed the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals in Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486
(Fed. Cir. 1992), rev’g, 795 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Iowa 1991)
and has held that the "saved seed" exception of the Plant
Variety Protection Act did not permit up to one-half of a
farmer's crop produced from a protected novel plant society
to be sold as seed in competition with the owner of the
novel variety. The court limited the right to save seed to the
seed needed to plant the farmer’s next crop. (See Harl, “The




APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. The decedent’s will
provided that all debts, including federal and state
inheritance and estate taxes, be paid from the residue of the
estate. The will also provided that the residue of the estate
was to pass to the surviving spouse and that if any property
was disclaimed by the surviving spouse, the disclaimed
property was to pass to a trust for the decedent’s children.
The surviving spouse disclaimed specific shares of stock
which were part of the residuary estate. Conn. Gen. Stat. §
12-401 provided that the tax liability of an estate was to  be
apportioned among the beneficiaries unless the testator
specified otherwise. The issue then was whether the
disclaimed property was part of the residuary estate and
subject to the will’s provision that taxes were to be paid
from the residuary estate. The IRS ruled that under
Connecticut law, estate assets were part of the residuary
estate unless the assets were specifically bequeathed by the
will. Because the will did not specifically identify which
assets would pass to the trust upon a disclaimer, the
disclaimed property was not converted into a specific
bequest; therefore, the taxes were still allocated to the
disclaimed property. The IRS noted that if this rule were not
applied, a surviving spouse could convert an entire residuary
estate into specific bequests and subvert the intent of the
decedent. Ltr. Rul. 9502007, Oct. 6, 1994.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* A
trust was established for the decedent by court order
resulting from a malpractice lawsuit brought by the
decedent. The decedent’s parents were the trustees of the
trust until the death of the decedent, at which time the
parents became the beneficiaries of equal shares of the trust.
The trust provided that if the parents disclaimed any portion
of the income interests in the trust, the disclaimed interest
passed to a charitable lead trust with 8 percent annuity
payments to charities for 15 years. After 15 years the trust
property passed to the parent who disclaimed the trust
interest. One parent disclaimed a fraction of the interests in
the trusts. The IRS ruled that the lead trusts would qualify as
guaranteed annuity interest and the decedent’s estate could
claim the present value of the lead trusts as a charitable
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9501036, Oct. 6, 1994.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will bequeathed property to the surviving spouse
in trust and named the surviving spouse as executrix. The
will provided that the executrix had the authority to
determine how much of the decedent's residuary estate
would be used to fund the trust. The IRS argued that the
trust property was not QTIP because (1) the property did not
vest in the surviving spouse as of the date of the decedent’s
death and (2) the property did not pass from the decedent to
the surviving spouse but passed only by the actions of the
executrix. The Tax Court agreed and held that the trust did
not qualify for the marital deduction as QTIP. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the statute, I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7),
did not express any requirement that the QTIP property be
QTIP on the date of the decedent’s death. The court also
distinguished Jackson v. U.S., 376 U.S. 503 (1964), because
QTIP did not exist when Jackson was decided and Jackson
could not be used to counter the plain language of the
statute. The appellate court also held that the trust property
qualified under I.R.C. § 2056(c) as passing from the
decedent because Section 2056(c) did not control for
purposes of QTIP property which is controlled by Section
2056(b)(7)(A) which states that QTIP property is not to be
treated as passing to anyone other than the surviving spouse.
The court noted that its decision is supported by Estate of
Robertson v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate
of Clayton v. Comm’r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992); and
one of the I.R.S.’s own letter rulings, Ltr. Rul. 8631005,
April 23, 1986. Est. of Spencer v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,188 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’g, T.C. Memo.
1992-579.
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY FOR ESTATE TAX.
The taxpayer was a co-executor of the taxpayer’s
grandfather’s estate and received a bequest from the estate.
The taxpayer signed the estate tax return which was
determined by the IRS to be deficient by $37,000 in taxes
owed. The court found that the taxpayer distributed all of
the estate with actual or constructive notice of the amount of
tax due; therefore, the taxpayer was personally liable for any
unpaid tax.  In addition, the court held that the taxpayer was
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liable for the unpaid tax because the taxpayer had received
property from the estate. Beckwith v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-20.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[2].*  The decedents, husband and wife,
transferred remainder interests in three properties to their
daughter for a small amount of cash and a promissory note;
however, the cash and face amount of the notes were much
smaller than the fair market value of the properties at the
time of the transfers. The decedents retained possession and
life estates in the properties.  Under I.R.C. § 2036(a), a
decedent’s gross estate includes all property transferred by
the decedent in which the decedent has retained a life estate,
unless the decedent had received full and adequate
consideration for the transfer.  The court held that the value
of the entire property was to be used to determine whether
the consideration received was adequate and full for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2036(a); therefore, because the
transferee paid only a small portion of the full fair market
value of each property, the entire value of the properties at
the date of death was included in the decedents’ gross
estates, less the amount of cash actually received before the
decedents’ deaths.   Pittman v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,186 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The taxpayer owned land which
was condemned by a state highway commission. The
taxpayer challenged the commission’s appraisal of the land
in court and obtained a jury verdict for a higher amount. The
taxpayer was not satisfied with that judgment and appealed
further. The taxpayer obtained counsel for the appeal who
agreed on a fee based on any additional amount obtained for
the land. The state settled with the taxpayer for a much
higher amount and the taxpayer allocated a pro rata portion
of the attorney’s fees to the interest portion of the settlement
payments. The IRS argued that the attorney’s fees should
have been allocated entirely to the principal of the
settlement and used to increase the basis of the property and
reduce only the capital gains recognized by the taxpayer.
The court held that the proper test for allocation of
attorney’s fees is the “origin of the claim” giving rise to the
expense. The court held that the taxpayer has the burden of
proving the origin of each expense and that a pro rata
allocation is insufficient to demonstrate the origin of the
attorney’s fees. The court held that the entire amount of
attorney’s fees was to be allocated to the principal portion of
the settlement and was a nondeductible capital expense
usable only to increase the property’s basis. Baylin v. U.S.,
95-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,023 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff’g, 30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1994).
C CORPORATIONS
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX. The taxpayer
corporation operated a full spectrum dairy operation, from
dairy farms to distribution of milk. The taxpayer had
accumulated earnings and had filed a statement under I.R.C.
§ 534(c) describing the accumulation of earnings for several
purposes, including (1) operating funds, (2) self-insurance,
(3) herd replacement, (4) pollution control, (5) capital
improvements, (6) market response needs, and (7) herd
relocation and land development. Under I.R.C. § 534(a)(2)
and Tax Court Rule 142(c), the burden of proof that the
accumulated earnings were reasonable on each point would
shift to the IRS if the Section 534(c) statement was
sufficient on each point. The court held that the statement
was not sufficient on points (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7) because
the taxpayer did not set forth the specific needs and the
supporting evidence for those needs. The court held that the
burden of proof shifted to the IRS on points (4) and (5) only
for taxable years in which the taxpayer’s statement provided
specific information on the taxpayer’s needs for the
accumulated earnings. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc. v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-11.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.
CONTRIBUTED PROPERTY. Under I.R.C. §
704(c)(1), (2), a partner who contributes appreciated
property to a partnership recognizes gain if the property is
distributed to another partner within five years after the
property is contributed to the partnership. Under I.R.C. §
737, a partner who contributed appreciated property to a
partnership recognizes gain upon the distribution to that
partner of partnership property, other than money, to the
extent of the lesser of (1) the net precontribution gain on the
property contributed to the partnership by the partner or (2)
the excess of the value of the distributed property over the
adjusted basis of the partner’s interest in the partnership.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations implementing
these rules. 60 Fed. Reg. 2352 (Jan. 9, 1995).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES.  The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company (LLC) under the South
Dakota Limited Liability Act (the Act), S.D. Codified Laws
§§ 47-34.1 et seq. The IRS ruled that the LLC would be
taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked the
corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the state
LLC law and the LLC agreement required the consent of all
members to continue the partnership after a terminating
event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
transferability of interests because the Act provided that if
any other member objected to the sale or assignment of a
member’s interest in the LLC, the transferee or assignee had
no right to participate in the management of the LLC.  Rev.
Rul. 95-9, I.R.B. 1995-3, 17.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in December
1994, the weighted average is 7.26 percent with the
permissible range of 6.54 to 7.99 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 95-2, I.R.B. 1995-2, 59.
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS has
announced the 1995 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
or Exchange Amount Amount
1995 $3,523,600 $2,516,900
The $3,523,600 figure is the dividing line for 1995 below
which (in terms of seller financing) the minimum interest
rate is the lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal Rate.
Where the amount of seller financing exceeds the
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$3,523,600 figure, the imputed rate is 100 percent of the
AFR except in cases of sale-leaseback transactions, where
the imputed rate is 110 percent of AFR. If the amount of
seller financing is $2,516,900 or less (for 1995), both parties
may elect to account for the interest under the cash method
of accounting.  Rev. Rul. 95-10, I.R.B. 1995-5.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayers were
each 50 percent shareholders in an S corporation which
during 1988 had no accumulated earnings or profits. The
taxpayers had no basis in their stock but received
distributions from the corporation in 1988. The corporation
conducted several passive activities. The IRS ruled that the
distributions were to be treated as a sale or exchange of
property; therefore, the allocation rules of Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.469-2T(e)(3) applied for allocation of the gain
among the corporation’s business activities because the
corporation’s taxable year commenced before February 19,
1988. Thus, the taxpayers could use any reasonable method,
including the method prescribed by Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.469-2T(e)(3)(ii). Ltr. Rul. 9501001, Nov. 19, 1993.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TERMINATION. The plaintiff’s decedent, the
plaintiff’s father, had farmed the defendant’s land under an
oral lease for almost 20 years. On occasion, the decedent
hired persons to assist in the farming and the plaintiff
actually farmed the land one year, although the defendants
had no knowledge of the involvement of others in the farm.
The decedent had some plowing done in December 1992 but
died in January 1993. The plaintiff was told not to farm the
land and that the estate would be reimbursed for expenses
already incurred. The defendant signed a lease with a third
party. The plaintiff, however, continued to prepare the soil
and plant beans on the property. Under 735 Ill. Codified
Stat. § 5/9-206, a termination of a farm lease must be given
in writing no less than four months before the end of the
current lease year. The trial court held that because the
defendant relied on the personal expertise of the decedent
and had no knowledge of others farming the land, the lease
was a personal service contract which terminated with the
death of the decedent. The court held that the existence of
the landlord-tenant relationship did not require the four
month advance notice of termination because the contract
was a personal service contract. The court reasoned that this
rule would benefit future tenants because to hold otherwise
would bind descendants to carry out farm leases entered into
by their decedent. The plaintiff did receive the value of the
goods and services invested in the crop. Ames v. Syler, 642
N.E.2d 1340 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
FEED. The plaintiff owned and operated a thoroughbred
racehorse farm and fed the horses feed purchased from one
defendant and produced by the other defendant. Eleven of
the plaintiff’s horses died from leukoencephalomalacia
(leuko) caused by toxins in the feed produced by moldy
corn in the feed. The plaintiff settled with the feed supplier.
The jury verdict found the producer liable for the deaths of
the horses but also attributed 10 percent of the fault to the
plaintiff. The jury answers to interrogatories indicated that
the feed was unreasonably dangerous but that the plaintiff
had not suffered any damage. The trial court noted that the
jury may have considered the settlement with the supplier as
fully compensating the plaintiff. The appellate court held
that the trial court should have entered a verdict JNOV for
the plaintiff to correct the jury error. The feed producer
argued that it was not liable because it was not a
manufacturer of the corn in the feed. The corn came from
corn screenings resulting from the cleaning and other
processing of whole corn for export. The court held that the
corn screenings were “manufactured” by the defendant
sufficient to make the defendant liable for defects in the
corn. The court also held that the plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent by 10 percent because the plaintiff
had no knowledge that feeding corn to horses posed a risk of
leuko in horses and that such knowledge was not common
in the horse industry. Adkins v. Burris Mill & Feed, Inc.,
644 So.2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION. The defendants
originally owned 926 acres and borrowed money from an
insurance company and granted a deed of trust on 724 acres
of the land. The deed of trust contained a due on sale clause.
The defendants sold 693 acres to one buyer, 533 acres of
which was included in the deed of trust, and sold 191 acres
to another buyer, all of which were included in the deed of
trust. The buyers both agreed to assume the insurance
company loan but the insurance company asserted its due on
sale clause right and allowed the buyers some time to obtain
alternate financing. The defendants had agreed to accept a
lien on the sold land as part of the purchase price and to
subordinate the lien to the insurance company’s lien. The
buyer of the 533 acres did find alternate financing from the
plaintiff which failed to obtain a subordination agreement
from the defendants at the closing, thus giving, at least on
paper, the defendants a superior lien on all the property
because the plaintiff’s lien did not arise until after the
defendants’ lien. The buyer of the 191 acres obtained
financing from another lender. The plaintiff argued that its
lien was entitled to priority on all of the land by equitable
subordination of the defendants’ lien because the defendants
had agreed to subordinate their lien to the insurance
company lien. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to equitable subordination as to the 533 acres because the
plaintiff's lien made the sale possible and left the defendants
in the same priority position as to the original lien. The
court held, however, that the plaintiff did not have priority
as to the remaining 160 acres because the insurance
company did not have a lien on those acres and the plaintiffs
never agreed to subordinate its lien as to those acres.  In
addition, the court held that the plaintiff’s lien did not have
priority as to the 191 acres because the plaintiff had no lien
on those acres. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Ogden, 886







INDEMNIFICATION. The plaintiff raised elk which
were tested for tuberculosis by the state veterinarian. The
first test resulted in ten elk testing positive so the
veterinarian performed a second test which showed only six
elk as infected. The state veterinarian ordered the six elk to
be slaughtered in order to be certain that the elk were
infected. The plaintiff and the state veterinarian reached an
agreement on the value of the elk for indemnification
purposes and the plaintiff sought a ruling that the other elk
were to be slaughtered because of the disease and the same
value would be used for their indemnification. The plaintiff
argued that once the state veterinarian established criteria
for the second test, the criteria had to be followed in
determining whether the other four elk should have been
slaughtered. The court held that the state veterinarian had
the discretion to determine whether a test result warranted
the destruction of an animal; therefore, a court could not
order the state veterinarian to destroy the animals.
Carmack v. Saunders, 994 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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